Never- theles Sji Castro iias taken a long step toward the Soviet side In (tie fii]»i-SOTisfc eos Llaomssr' ^ tom Oastco has ncelral a Btzong boost to his ego; asiiraiiii B of continued ceanomle sop- port; the commitment of Soviet prestige to the Cuban revolution; and recognition of Cuba's special importance as an example of what the revolutionary struggle can achieve in Latin America. Stgniflcant policy differences between Castro and the fltwlet leaders w«e ay Scptemlier to tf BDanl B ngpart fear that caus*, and top Qiban of Ei(; Eali to OBean Tiglv hiva beceona identified with it.
Bwatise of dw Jlrotig p OHftfon th*y have tdkets in fnvnr of rlotcnfo with the VS, leading inemfacr^ of the Rodriquez ^nup nttist realize that shoti M Gbabv fed «fn- bamissed or thwartnl in his overture* oc in in Uize: ttegotiations, thfty wfluld be the Ing^ SCftpcgoats.
^ Cuba's id UUiy ktad Bn ajpareot^ also favor noo Dd Ung bilalenil d If Eeamiaei with the US, but Wi Oi some aerioitf oif^vlngi L Ti My i o MB W n A la Castro's pubhc assessin OTt early this y^ar that the ^danf» of US aggr Gukm" lwd diminished greatly, Tlieyak Dmlite Qikt Iheir goals of legaining Gvan- ■annmo tiod ending VS t Oalnwi^s Hin Bb &gfia qbd onfy he aeh L«ved in flie conteit nf a gewnl np- pcochemcnt. At the same time, many pre Hjnt and former rafl Umy leaders are ooueemcd about Ibu possible fll Fwti «f detail B, and will Jhiiat m p Uyiug an onpartant j^lc in any b Ualenil mgotlations In osnder to protect their intcrcst H.
Soon of Castro's forme* gi H^rrilla cotlca£ues new in c U viiim Jobc probably deaine gu Mter indc^nicoce £(Qm Hoaoinr flwen ait llie eii^pfeain of support, but they arc a distinct minority.
Castro weiiihs in itnmgiy with the majority^ for dome^sl Lc po Utlcal feaaoo B and becanse be knows that Cuba has no allenutfvc, Most tmportantly, he b«^liev«:s thnt he can successfully pursue his leadership goals in Latl Ti Anicnca and the Thixi World while Qajoy- intf 0» bnefils offab clona iwwwfatfon wltl Mos- cow r Cuba and ihe US % Oubtt has nunvvd to Mxa K^ Onha's differ- enoes with the US, partly in reipil BAK to pressures '£rom Moseow and the Rodiigucz proup.
■ Cahlra winfi labse Ki Hl wfth liiai Iwlf af Ihc pupulai Hti uihkr 25.
itm J with ibt tfnamfto Tl Hk tni KBlc Ma In them th* (mii Im ud liofias f» Aj ihc M and utbcr pn Auns Iinw inc Nunl.
Tfiey paiticularly tear that cultural and kiookigks^ in^enocs from &B VS CDdd "ksonv Bt Cuban jdw A iad liicnt imdiectaln Hi a natbnial cai Dpaf^ ttnnd at pcmfil^ ing such "diversioiiijm," Because of the relatively austere Unc they tdfe on j»od Al and economic ksne M, tlwy probably a Uaiii ieps Impoitanoe to any «»- i Kirnic advantage! A)- tho^igh there is no evidence on the po Ent, ttiey may abo ww^y that once Cuba, and the US came to tenns, the hnportain* of tbdr eounfiy swt Us ral Jl- taty needs will recede it\ the Soviet view.
They pfobably prefer Eliatiapivacheateat proceod slowly, and p D6bab|y aiv coumt Umg Caati Q to hold ftst to his posit wn that Cuba ivill not enter tema] talks until the US sanctions are lifted nni Jat^lty, FUuf Castro's opinion on tlicsc issues is not known, but as the originator of the cainpa%n i^l Allf lldfidbll^ cal diversiodjm'' be mtut slum- aomm gf |3|g p«air$ to believe diat tho US ia oa tke def^Qsive^ lilut katematk Hid pnestwes am the 4o Neeeainodil B Iibn m ftucitad Dg, undl Hut US public opinion is a UAfaif gjmdually but dfr^ c Lsdvely in his favor. Althjcvugb Castro has tmmitt Bk Bbly £ig:iialcd hit wl Uingaesi lo bogfii ■ dialogue widi the US, we bdf Vivttiif lie does iwrt have a concrete time- table or prognun sn A that a ]i(imbii-4iihi 01 411 yu Tim^l .ulhltfllll -4 Castro Agonistes: The Mounting Dilemmas and Frustrations of Cuba's Cmdmo V~ Eiiniti Jiion MKiini m ■Mr wfi T A* liriwwi Mil M 4f l AQi t^fmf.
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